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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COLLIN L. HANSEN, the duly appointed, 
acting and qualified administrator of 
the estate of Bernard Hansen, deceased, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
DELLA A. CHRISTENSEN, the duly appointed 
and acting and qualified administratrix 
of the estate of Arnold Christensen, 
deceased and DELLA A. CHRISTENSEN, 
individually, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No, 
14112 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff in the above entitled matter brought this 
action to compel specific performance by the sellers under 
a real estate contract covering approximately 137 acres 
of land in Box Elder County, Utah, under ivhich contract 
the plaintiff buyers were in default in the payments as 
well as in the payment of taxes. Plaintiff's contention 
is that by depositing a cashier's check in the amount of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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$2,422.00 with one J. Leo Nelson, vice-president of a bank 
on November 1, 1962, entitled them to a deed notwithstand-
ing the first payment on the contract was made eight 
months late and the second, and third and final payments 
had never been made, the final payment being delinquent 
t\^ enty-two months and no taxes having been paid for 
almost four years by the plaintiff. Defendants contend 
the contract was terminated by Plaintiff's breaches under 
its terms, and that no proper tender of performance could 
have been nor was made sufficient to justify the court 
ordering specific performance of the contract. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Box Elder County, Judge VeNoy 
Christoffersen presiding, ruled that it was up to the 
defendants to give notice of default and exercise one 
of her options prior to November 1, 1962, and that the 
deposit at a bank of a cashier1s check on that date was 
a valid tender of full performance, and ordered defendants 
to convey the land to plaintiff. The court further 
awarded plaintiff $700.00 attorney's fees. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the lower court's order 
for specific performance, the plaintiff having been long 
in default of the contract, that the purported tender 
of performance was not timely made, was inadequate as a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tender and was insufficient to cover the amount 
delinquent, and finally to reverse the lower court's 
award of attorney's fees to plaintiff, the party breach-
ing the contract. . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 1, 1958, Arnold and Delia A. Christensen 
entered into a contract to sell to Bernard Hansen and 
Hansen to purchase from Christensen 137.1 acres sometimes 
referred to as the muskrat farm (Tr. Page 15-Line 16) 
involved in this lawsuit. The contract, (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 1) provided that the purchase price was to 
be $4,000.00 payable $1,200.00 upon execution of the 
contract, receipt for which was acknowledged and the 
balance to be paid $900.00 plus accrued interest on January 
1, 1959, $900.00 plus accrued interest January 1, 1960 
and $1,000.00 plus accrued interest on January 1, 1961. 
Hansen agreed to pay promptly, when due, all taxes and 
assessments levied upon the property from and after 
January 1, 1958. The parties agreed that time was of the 
essence and the acceptance of payment other than according 
to the terms of the contract was in no way to alter the 
terms of the contract as to forfeiture therein before 
mentioned. (Emphasis Added). Hansen was given 90 day 
grace period and the agreement was that in the event any 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. -4- ' 
default in payment of principal, interest, taxes, 
or other failure to comply with the contract, 
Christensens were given all remedies provided by 
law, without election among them, and in addition had 
options (1) to declare the entire amount of principal 
and interest immediately due and payable and proceed 
to foreclose their grantors lien, (2) the right to 
enter upon and take possession of said real property 
together with all improvements thereon, (3) terminate 
the contract in which event any payments theretofore 
made became forfeited to the grantors and the grantors 
were to be released of all obligation whether in law 
or equity to convey said property. 
Upon the final payment of principal and interest, 
taxes and assessments, when the same became due, and 
upon full performance by Hansen of all of the terms 
and conditions and provisions of the agreement, nthen 
and in that event the grantors, (Christensens) agree 
to execute and deliver to the grantee, warranty deed 
covering the above described real property." (Emphasis 
Added). 
On September 8, 1959, $900.00 principal and $168.00 
interest was paid by Hansen (receipt part of plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 5), but nothing was paid on taxes. By every-
one's admission all taxes were paid from January 1958 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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through the date of the law suit by the Christensens. 
(Tr. 94-29), On October 31, 1962, Collin Hansen, a 
son of the deceased Bernard Hansen went to the 
Christensen Home as he said, to find out how much 
was owing, compute the interest and to make a check 
to the Christensens (Tr. 32-19). No money or check 
was tendered to the Christensens at that time. (Tr. 
33-7). The Christensens testified that Collin Hansen 
said he was there to make a payment on the land, had 
no check made out and never did offer any specific 
amount either of cash or a check to the Christensens. 
(Tr. 58-24; Tr. 67-18). At that time Hansen was no-
tified that the Christensens had terminated the contract 
sometime in the past and there was no further contract 
between the parties. (See also Tr. 30-12). Christensens 
continued to use the ground in about the same manner 
as before the contract, that is, for hunting, pasturing, 
and layout ground though the particular federal program 
had ended. (Tr. 71 and 72). 
On the next day a letter (Plaintiff1s Exhibit No. 
2) was sent by Collin Hansen's attorney advising Delia 
Christensen that she could go to the office of J. Leo 
Nelson in the First Security Bank, Brigham City Office, 
and there pick up a cashier's check for $2,422.02 in 
exchange for deeds from the administratrix of Arnold 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Christensen and a deed from Mrs. Christensen. Aside 
from the phone call or calls between the said J. Leo 
Nelson and Delia Christensen, nothing of significance 
was done by the Hansens (concerning the contract) or 
to appoint an administrator for Bernard Hansen's 
estate until 1974. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BEING A REMEDY OF EQUITY, ONE WHO 
INVOKES IT MUST HAVE CLEAN HANDS IN HAVING DONE EQUITY 
HIMSELF. 
This Court's holding in the case Fischer vs. Johnson 
No. 13530 dated August 6, 1974, and reported in 525 Pac 
2nd 45 appears to be controlling of similar if not iden-
tical issues in this case. In the Fischer Case the lower 
court had granted specific performance to a defaulting 
buyer and this court used the following language: 
"But it is also true that specific performance 
is a remedy of equity; and one who invokes it must 
have clean hands in having done equity himself. 
That is, he must take care to discharge his own 
duties under the contract; and he cannot rely on 
any mere inconvenience as an excuse for his failure 
to do so. Even if inconvenience or difficulty is 
/•/.- encountered, he must make an effort to perform, or 
to tender performance, which manifests reasonable 
diligence and a bona fide desire to keep his own 
promises." 
The court further rejected in the Fischer Case 
the plaintiff's contention that a notice stating that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plaintiff's were ready and willing to enter into and 
perform the purchase contract as planned was an 
attempt with reasonable diligence and good faith to do 
what the agreement required of them. In the instant 
case the record is void of any attempt, offer or even 
contact by the plaintiff from September 8, 1959 to 
October 31, 1962, and no taxes had ever been paid or 
offered from 1958 on. As stated by this court in the 
Fischer Case, 
'The plaintiffs having so failed-to put themselves 
in the position to demand specific performance, the 
judgment and decree to that effect cannot properly 
be sustained -
POINT II. 
THE PARTY GUILTY OF THE FIRST BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CANNOT COMPLAIN IF THE OTHER PARTY THEREFORE REFUSES 
TO PERFORM. 
"Although originally rightfully in possession 
under a contract for the purchase of land, the 
character of the purchasers possession changes and 
becomes tortious, at the option of the vendor, when 
the purchaser disaffirms the contract, disavows the 
title under which he has entered, refuses payment 
of the purchase money, or otherwise fails or refuses 
to comply with the terms of the conract, and he then 
becomes liable to eviction as a trespasser. Imme-
diately upon the purchasers failur to comply with the 
terms of the contract the vendor may treat him as a 
trespasser and sue to recover the possession.fr 
55 Am Jur Vendor and Purchaser Section 438. See 
also 17 Am Jur 2nd Contracts Section 365. 
The above language was quoted almost verbatim by this 
court in the case of Lynch vs. McDonald 367 Pac 2nd 464; 
12 Utah 2nd 427. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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While there may be many cases holding that when the 
option to declare the entire balance due on the default 
of a purchaser and to sue for the entire balance, a notice 
of such election must necessarily be made by the seller, s 
such \tfould not seem to be the case where termination of 
the contract is the object and nothing further is required 
from the buyers. 
A Montana Case, Hammond Dodson Company vs. Slattery 
216 Pac 323 holds no prior notice is necessary where cancella-
tion of the contract is sought, the suit itself being a 
sufficient election, and a similar result was reached in 
Rauch vs Zender 138 Wash 610 245 Pac 17. 
POINT III 
NO PROPER TENDER EXCUSING PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO PERFORM 
HAS BEEN MADE. 
!rA mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid 
tender, the law requires that the tenderer have 
the money present and ready and produce and actually 
offer it to the other party. Tender implies the 
physical act of offering the money or thing to be 
tendered, but this cannot rest in implication alone. 
The law requires an actual present physical offer; 
it is not satisfied by a mere spoken offer to pay, 
which although indicative of a present possession 
of the money and the intention to produce it, is 
'unaccompanied by any visible manifestation of intention 
to make the offer good.1' 52 Am Jur Tender Section 7. 
Clearly there was no tender on October 31, 1962. 
As to whether or not a tender was made by the 
writing of a letter from plaintiffTs attorney advising 
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Christensens that a cashiers check was available to 
them in the office of J. Leo Nelson in the First 
Security Bank, Brigham City, must be answered in the 
negative for the following reasons: 
First; The offer by letter to pay, unaccompanied by 
the money, is no more than a mere spoken offer to pay 
and not accompanied by any visible manisfestation of 
intention to make the offer good. The law requires an 
actual present physical offer. It is impossible to 
construe the letter of Mr. Mann as a tender. 
Second; The tender was conditioned upon the Christensens, 
residents of Bear River City as set forth in the contract, 
traveling to a different city when the terms of the 
contract provided for the payment to the Christensens. 
Third; The provisions of the contract were independant, 
that is, the obligation of the Hansens to pay in full 
promptly when due or within 90 days thereafter all prin-
cipal, interest and taxes, were all conditions precedent 
to the agreement of the sellers to execute and deliver 
to the grantee a warranty deed. 5 5 Am Jur Vendor and 
Purchaser Section 105 covers this problem and contains 
the following language: 
"The order of time in which the parties are to 
perform is a most material consideration in 
determining whether the agreements are dependant 
or independant. --Where by the contract, payment 
is to precede conveyance, a tender of a deed is not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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necessary to an action for the purchase price. 
The broad rule has been lain down that if the time 
of payment must or may happen before the time for 
conveyance arrives, performance of the agreement 
of the vendor to convey is not a condition of the 
purchasers agreement to pay and accordingly, the 
vendor has a right to sue without an offer on his 
part to convey. --The promise of the purchaser to 
pay has been held in some cases to be independant 
of the performance of the vendors promise to convey 
where the contract provides that the vendor will 
convey !after1 the payments or if the purchaser 
shall !first* pay. 
The language of the contract in question here, makes it 
clear that buyer must timely perform and must pay when 
due all taxes, interest and principal before the sellers 
agreement to execute and deliver a warranty deed arises. 
POINT IV. 
THE CHECK HELD BY THE BANKER WAS INSUFFICIENT IN AMOUNT 
TO COVER THE DELINQUENT BALANCE 
Uner the terms of the contract there became due on 
January 1, 1959, $900.00 principal and accrued interest 
at 6% per annum from the date of the contract to-wit: 
$168.00. Since nothing was paid en January 1, 1959 
there was a total unpaid balance of $2,968.00 which 
would likewise draw interest at the rate of 61 per 
annum (See 15-1-1 UCA, and Farnworth vs. Jensen 117 
Utah 494; 217 Pac 2nd 571) wherein this court held, 
!TA vendor is entitled to interest upon unpaid 
installments of interest as though it had been 
paid to him and he had reloaned it." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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T.his would equal $.4878 per day from January 1, 
1959 to September 8, 1959, ($122.43) making a total 
unpaid balance on September 8, 1959 of $3,090.43. In 
fact there was only $1,068.00 paid leaving a $2,022.43 
balance. Since there was another payment due on January 
1, 1960 of both principal and accrued interest, the above 
said balance would draw interest of $37.89 and should be 
added making a total of $2,060.32 as the unpaid balance 
on the contract as of January 1, 1960. At 6% on this 
balance there would be an additional- sum of $123.61 for 
the interest due on January 1, 1961, which when added 
to the previous principal makes a total of $2,183.93 due 
January 1, 1961, the date for final performance of the 
contract. The interest at 6% on that sum, from January 
1, 1961 until November 1, 1962 would be $240.20 for a tota 
amount due of principal and interest of $2,424.13. In 
addition to this the taxes for 4 years totalling $25.16 
with interest of $3.42 thereon, would have to be added 
in order to determine the amount owing under the contract, 
to-wit: $2,452.71. Plaintifffs check was for only 
$2,422.02. 
52 Am Jur Tender, Section 22 says: 
"As a general rule, a tender must include everything 
to which the creditor is entitled, and a tender of 
any less sum is nugatory and ineffective as a tender, 
--It must include interest due, costs, etc. . It 
is the duty of the debtor to make sure that his tende 
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is sufficient in amount, and ordinarily it is 
immaterial that he did not know the correct amount, 
or believed that his tender was adequate in amount. 
He acts at his peril and must see to it that his 
tender is sufficient in amount; any deficiency in 
amount is at his peril.ff 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
DEFAULTING PLAINTIFF. 
Following the reasoning of this court in Fischer 
vs. Johnson, and Lynch vs. McDonald, Supra, it would 
appear clear that plaintiff was not entitled to specific 
performance, was himself the only defaulter, and there 
being no suggestion even that the defendant was at any 
time in default it would appear there could be no basis 
for awarding plaintiff $700.00 or any sum as attorneyTs 
fees. The contract called for final payment of prin-
cipal and interest, taxes and assessments, when the 
same became due, all of which provisions plaintiff 
ignored for at least 22 months and for as much as four 
years. To rei^ ard such prolonged indifference and 
ignoring of promises by plaintiff with $700.00 attorney!s 
fees is error. 
CONCLUSION 
The purported tender in this case of a cashier's 
check at a place foreign to the place of contract, in an 
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amount insufficient to cover the obligations, including 
interest and taxes, conditioned upon the delivery of deeds 
to purported heirs or an administrator yet to be appointed, 
coming at a time when plaintiff had been in default for 
four years in the payment of taxes, was 34 months delinquent 
in one payment and 22 months delinquent in the final 
payment due under the contract, does not permit the 
view that plaintiff is in court with clean hands entitled 
to specific performance, but rather compels the conclusion 
that plaintiff having ignored his own.promises and respon-
sibilities under the contract is entitled to no equitable 
relief and no attorney1s fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Omer J. Call, Attorney at Law 
26 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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